When a Deputy's Distracted Driving Kills Someone, Is It a Constitutional Violation? The Seventh Circuit Says Not Clearly

Oct 15, 2026 · 5 min read · By Brandon J. Grable

Case: Estate of Ceaser Stinson v. Joel Streicher, No. 22-3043 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2026) (published). Opinion by Judge Sykes, joined by Judges Ripple and St. Eve. Read the opinion on the Seventh Circuit's website.

What happened

In January 2020, a Milwaukee County sheriff's deputy was on patrol in Milwaukee in an unmarked sheriff's vehicle. He was going about 29 to 30 miles per hour in a 30 mph zone. As he approached an intersection, the light turned yellow and then red. He never saw it change. By the agreed facts, he was looking down at his phone or his dashboard computer, or both, for about 15.5 seconds. He drove through the red light and hit a car that was lawfully crossing the intersection. The other driver, Ceaser Stinson, died at the scene.

The deputy later resigned and pleaded guilty to a state misdemeanor, homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle. Mr. Stinson's estate sued him in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute, along with several state-law claims. The § 1983 claim said the deputy violated Mr. Stinson's right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The trial judge denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment. The judge said a jury should decide whether the deputy's inattention was bad enough to violate the Constitution, and that qualified immunity could wait until after the jury's verdict. The deputy appealed right away, which the law allows when immunity is denied.

What the court decided

The Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered judgment for the deputy on the § 1983 claim. The court made three main points.

First, the appeal could go forward now. The estate argued the appeals court had no jurisdiction because the trial judge never actually ruled on immunity. The court disagreed. Qualified immunity is meant to protect officials from having to go to trial at all, so putting off the question until after a verdict effectively denies it. Because the deputy accepted the agreed facts and argued only about the law, the court could hear the appeal.

Second, the evidence did not show a due-process violation. Under the Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998), a crash caused by an officer is a constitutional violation only if the officer's conduct "shocks the conscience." Negligence is not enough. In a non-emergency setting like this one, the plaintiff generally has to show the officer was deliberately indifferent, meaning he actually knew harm was about to happen and consciously chose not to prevent it. The court called the deputy's 15.5 seconds of distracted driving negligent, "perhaps gross negligence," but found no evidence that he knew a crash was coming and chose to ignore it.

Third, even if there were a violation, the law was not clearly established. Qualified immunity protects an officer unless earlier court decisions made it clear that the specific conduct was unconstitutional. The estate pointed to cases where officers drove at extreme speeds, ran lights on purpose, or raced through intersections they knew they could not see. The court said those cases involved reckless, intentional choices, not distraction. No case had held that an officer's distracted driving violates due process, and the court found this was not the rare "obvious" case that needs no prior precedent.

Why it matters

This decision shows how hard it can be to bring a federal civil rights claim over a crash caused by a government employee, even a fatal one. A few takeaways:

The Constitution is not a traffic code. Courts have repeatedly said the Fourteenth Amendment is not a substitute for ordinary negligence law. Careless driving, even very careless driving, usually does not support a § 1983 claim. What courts look for is something closer to intent: an officer who saw the danger and chose to drive into it anyway.

Qualified immunity turns on the facts of earlier cases. The court compared this crash to earlier cases involving speeding and deliberate red-light running and found them different in kind. That fact-by-fact comparison is at the heart of nearly every qualified immunity fight.

Timing matters. The court made clear that when an officer raises immunity, the trial court should decide it before trial, not after.

What this means in Texas

This is a Seventh Circuit decision, so it does not bind federal courts in Texas, which follow the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. But the core standard the court applied, the "shocks the conscience" test from County of Sacramento v. Lewis, is Supreme Court law that applies nationwide, and the qualified immunity framework is the same.

For Texans hurt in a crash caused by a police officer or other government driver, the takeaway is that a federal constitutional claim may not be the main route. Texas has its own rules for claims against government entities, including the Texas Tort Claims Act, which allows some claims for injuries arising from a government employee's operation of a motor vehicle. Those claims come with strict notice requirements and deadlines. The appeal in this case also involved only the federal claim; it did not decide the estate's state-law claims.

If you or a family member was injured by a government employee, talking with a lawyer early can help you understand which claims may be available and which deadlines apply.

This post is for general information only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts. Grable PLLC was not involved in this case.

Attorney responsible for content: Brandon J. Grable, Grable PLLC.

Topics: Qualified Immunity · Police Accountability