Seventh Circuit upholds an injunction against Indiana's extra union-dues hurdles for teachers only as viewpoint discrimination

Nov 10, 2026 · 5 min read · By Brandon J. Grable

Case: Anderson Federation of Teachers v. Rokita, No. 23-1823 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2026) (published; opinion by Judge Lee, joined by Judges Sykes and Hamilton). Read the opinion

The short version

Indiana lets employees have union dues taken straight out of their paychecks. In 2021, the state added extra steps that applied only to public school teachers: a state-written form, annual renewal, an email confirmation, and a yearly notice of the right to quit the union. Teachers' unions sued. On Nov. 2, 2026, the Seventh Circuit held that singling out teachers this way was viewpoint discrimination that violates the First Amendment, and it affirmed a permanent injunction.

The court also held that the state-written statement on the authorization form was the government's own speech, not compelled speech by teachers.

What happened

Indiana's general wage-assignment law lets public and private employees authorize automatic payroll deductions, including for union dues. In 2021, Senate Enrolled Act 251 added new requirements for "school employees," which the court said, "as far as we can tell," covers only public school teachers. The court explained that SEA 251's 2021 amendments require teachers who want automatic dues deduction to:

• sign an authorization form containing a state-mandated statement about the right not to join or pay a union, printed in "14-point type boldface font";
• "renew their authorizations annually";
• have the employer send a message to the teacher's work email and "wait for a return confirmation from the same email address"; and
• receive notice "every year informing them of their right to quit the union and stop paying union dues."

SEA 297 later revised the form statement.

The court said these requirements "did not apply to any other public employees." Three teachers' unions and some of their members sued. The district court ultimately ruled for the state on compelled speech but held the extra requirements were viewpoint discriminatory, and it "permanently enjoined the State from enforcing them." The state appealed.

What the court decided

The form statement is government speech. After a later amendment (SEA 297), the statement on the form begins "The State of Indiana wishes to make you aware." The court held the form "does not require teachers to adopt Indiana's advisory statement as their own" and that "it is the State of Indiana—not the teacher—that is doing the informing." So the statement did not violate the Free Speech Clause.

Targeting only teachers is viewpoint discrimination. The parties agreed that processing payroll deductions is a government subsidy, and that the state may attach conditions to a subsidy as long as they are viewpoint neutral. The court held these conditions were not. The laws "intentionally single out public school teachers while allowing other public employees to authorize automatic payroll deductions without additional barriers." The court added: "The State simply has offered no justification for placing additional burdens on such a particularized group."

The state argued that teachers hold many different views. The court answered that the question is whether they share a perspective, and: "It does not require any imagination to conclude that public school teachers and their unions share the overarching interest of promoting teacher salaries and benefits, work conditions, and public education writ large." It concluded that "selectively conditioning access to that subsidy for public school teachers and their unions alone is indicative of viewpoint discrimination that the State has done nothing to rebut."

The state's reasons did not hold up. The state said the extra steps reduce the risk of deducting dues from people who don't want to be in a union. The court responded that "if this were the case, one would think that the State would impose additional hoops on all public employees rather than just teachers." The court also said the Supreme Court's Janus decision "has no relevance" because these teachers had already chosen to join and pay a union.

Strict scrutiny was fatal. Viewpoint discrimination triggers strict scrutiny. The state did not argue its interests were "compelling." The court held: "Absent this, the State may not impose additional conditions to receive the benefit of automatic payroll deductions solely because the requesting employee is a teacher." The judgment was affirmed.

Why this matters in Texas

Seventh Circuit decisions do not bind Texas courts. The case is still a clear example of a First Amendment principle that applies everywhere:

• The government can choose what to fund, but not whose viewpoint to burden. The government does not have to subsidize speech. But when it does, it cannot attach conditions that target a group because of its viewpoint.
• "Underinclusive" laws invite scrutiny. When a stated reason would apply to everyone but the law burdens only one group, courts may ask whether the real target is that group's views. Here, the court quoted the Supreme Court's warning that "restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content."
• Government speech has its own rules. When the state is clearly the one speaking, as with the revised form, a compelled-speech claim is much harder.

If you believe a Texas government body has singled you or your organization out because of your views, a First Amendment lawyer can help you evaluate your options.

Attorney advertising. This post is for general information only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and past results do not guarantee future outcomes.

Attorney responsible for content: Brandon J. Grable, Grable PLLC, 12451 Starcrest Dr, Suite 206, San Antonio, Texas.

Topics: First Amendment