Second Circuit overrules a 1980 rule and holds that a dismissal without a conviction can support a malicious prosecution claim

Nov 11, 2026 · 5 min read · By Brandon J. Grable

Case: Brill v. Ulster County, No. 25-2432, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34389 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2026) (published; opinion by District Judge Liman, sitting by designation, joined by Judges Calabresi and Merriam). Read the opinion

The short version

For more than 40 years, the Second Circuit (which covers New York, Connecticut, and Vermont) held that a common New York dismissal, an "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal," could never support a federal malicious prosecution claim because it is not a finding of innocence. On Nov. 10, 2026, the court recognized that rule as overruled by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Thompson v. Clark, which held that a prosecution ends favorably for these purposes when it ends without a conviction.

The plaintiff still lost that claim, for a different reason: her complaint did not allege any restraint on her liberty after she was arraigned. But the court held that the trial court should have let her amend her search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and § 1983 conspiracy claims, and sent the case back.

What happened

The court took the facts from the complaint. Cristina Brill ran an animal rescue in New York. She alleged that two humane-society peace officers and a competing rescue operator spread false claims that she neglected and tortured animals, and that their false statements were used to get an arrest warrant and a search warrant. In August 2021, those officers and two sheriff's officers arrested her and searched her home. She was arraigned on misdemeanor animal-cruelty charges.

In March 2024, the criminal case was disposed of by an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal under New York law. According to the complaint, the judge agreed only after the prosecutor said the government "could not prove the criminal charges against [Brill] beyond a reasonable doubt."

Brill sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court dismissed the whole complaint, including claims no defendant had moved to dismiss, and denied leave to amend. Brill appealed without a lawyer.

What the court decided

The old rule is gone. In 1980, in Singleton v. City of New York, the Second Circuit held that this kind of dismissal does not count as a "favorable termination." The court explained that Thompson looked to the law as it stood in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, and held that the favorable-termination element is met when the prosecution ends without a conviction. "Thus, it is no longer the case that an ACOD under New York law fails to qualify as a favorable termination solely because it is not a determination of innocence." Here, the court said, the prosecutor "abandoned the criminal case."

Plea deals and bargained-for diversion are different. The court distinguished its recent decisions holding that a charge dropped as part of a plea bargain, or a Connecticut diversion program the defendant bargained for over the prosecution's objection, does not count. A plea results in a conviction, and New York's dismissal requires the prosecution's consent.

Probable cause and qualified immunity still protect officers. The court said its ruling would not flood the courts, because "qualified immunity remains a potent backstop," and the change "may have significance only in those cases where a plaintiff can demonstrate an absence of probable cause and where the defendant violated clearly established law."

But the claim needs a seizure after arraignment. In the Second Circuit, a malicious prosecution claim must show a deprivation of liberty after arraignment. Being required to appear in court whenever ordered can count. Brill's complaint identified only her arrest and the arraignment itself. "Neither of those events is alleged to have occurred after her arraignment," so the claim as pleaded failed.

She gets another chance. The court held that the trial court dismissed her search and false arrest claims on its own without giving her notice, and that the defendants had not raised the post-arraignment ground below. So the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend those claims and her § 1983 conspiracy claim. It affirmed the denial of leave to amend her First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and § 1985(3) claims as futile.

Why this matters

The decision is another federal appeals court applying Thompson v. Clark to remove an old barrier to malicious prosecution claims:

• A dismissal does not have to say you were innocent. Under Thompson, the question is whether the case ended without a conviction.
• How the case ended still matters. The court treated dismissals that come from a plea bargain, or from a bargained-for program, differently from New York's ACOD, which requires the prosecution's consent.
• The complaint must allege a seizure after arraignment. In this circuit, a malicious prosecution claim must show a deprivation of liberty after arraignment. Being required to appear in court whenever ordered can count. Brill's complaint identified only her arrest and the arraignment itself, so the claim as pleaded failed.
• Probable cause and qualified immunity still matter. The court said "qualified immunity remains a potent backstop," and that the change "may have significance only in those cases where a plaintiff can demonstrate an absence of probable cause and where the defendant violated clearly established law."
• The case is not over. The court did not decide whether Brill's allegations are true, and the case returns to the trial court for amendment. The opinion does not say whether any party will seek rehearing.

Related reading: Malicious Prosecution Claims in Texas Under Section 1983.

Attorney advertising. This post is for general information only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Every case depends on its own facts, and past results do not guarantee future outcomes.

Attorney responsible for content: Brandon J. Grable, Grable PLLC, 12451 Starcrest Dr, Suite 206, San Antonio, TX 78216, (210) 963-5297, intake@grable.law. Office visits are by appointment only; calls and emails are accepted 24/7.

Topics: Fourth Amendment · Police Accountability